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ABSTRACT: In argumentation studies, almost all theoretical proposals are applied, in general, to the 
analysis and evaluation of written argumentative texts. I will consider mathematics to illustrate some 
differences between argumentative practice and the products of it, to emphasize the need to address 
the different types of argumentative discourse and argumentative situation. Argumentative practice 
should be encouraged when teaching technical subjects to convey a better understanding and to 
improve thought and creativity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Aristotle, logic has been considered a normative theory of reasoning and as 
such has been applied to the analysis and evaluation of arguments. In the last 
century, Toulmin (1958) noticed a gap between logic as a theory of argument and 
real practice; his work gave rise to new ways of conceiving and theorizing about 
arguments. The study of fallacies was pivotal in the development of the field of 
argumentation and emphasis on avoiding fallacious arguments when arguing in 
natural settings was the driving force behind the new theoretical proposals. In part 
because of these origins, almost all theoretical proposals in the field of 
argumentation apply to the analysis and evaluation of arguments, mostly in written 
texts.  
Johnson (2000) states that a theory of argumentation, considered as a theory 
of the practice of argumentation, has to consider many aspects not included in the 
study of its products. He defines argumentation as “the socio-cultural activity of 
constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing and revising arguments” (p. 12). 
For Johnson, a theory of argument is a component of a theory of argumentation and 
he considers that proper work has to be done first towards a better theory of 
argument in order to have a balanced theory of argumentation. 
Much work has been done to present actual examples of arguments as they 
appear in real practice but, nevertheless, it is still true that, as Hitchcock (2002, p. 
288) remarks of Johnson’s examples of argumentative interchanges, “[they] do not 
exhibit at first glance the features of one person interpreting and criticizing an 
argument and the argument’s author revising it in response to this criticism”, 
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features he considers constitutive of the practice of argumentation.  
The relationship between the theory and practice of argumentation has been 
reconsidered again in several recent papers, for example, those by Pinto (2001), 
Johnson (2005) and Kvernbekk (2012). The positions of the authors differ, but, 
when talking of practice, they usually consider specific arguments as they appear in 
argumentative exchanges in order to analyze the distance a normative theory of 
argument should maintain to be of any value to evaluate practice. In general, they 
want to assess the arguments as part of the activity, but not the activity as a whole.  
The ideal pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is “based on 
analytical considerations regarding the most pertinent presentation of the 
constitutive parts of a problem-valid procedure for carrying out a particular kind of 
discursive task” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005, p. 75). The emphasis is put in the 
activity, but here too, its application is devoted to the analysis and evaluation of the 
argumentative products. This is the case even in the latest attempts to look at the 
properties of what the above cited authors call activity types, defined as 
“conventionalized entities that can be distinguished by ‘external’ empirical 
observation of the communicative practices in the various domains […] of 
discourse” (p. 76). 
In this paper, I consider some issues of recent papers associated with 
mathematical argumentation in an attempt to contribute to the discussion about the 
role of arguing in mathematical practice and in the evaluation of the products of this 
practice. I argue that, in mathematical practice, argumentation considered as a 
rational, social and communicative activity should be encouraged to improve 
collaborative, efficient and creative work, but this does not necessarily imply that 
direct application of the current theories of ordinary argumentation to evaluate its 
products should be undertaken. The particular constraints of mathematical 
activities, for example, the rigor required for mathematical definitions and proofs 
and their institutionalized forms, are sufficient for their evaluation in the different 
contexts in which they arise. 
Application of problem-solving strategies has proved helpful for the 
successful accomplishment of mathematical tasks and the understanding of difficult 
mathematical concepts. In those cases, argumentation may be of help not only to 
raise and solve problems, formulate hypotheses, ask for justification of inferential 
steps, construct explanations and test one’s understanding, but also to establish 
relationships between concepts and the application of methods in different 
situations. That is, argumentation may be of help if mathematics is considered as a 
critical and collaborative inquiry to look for a solution to a problem. Nevertheless, 
adaptation to the specific activity type and the actual context may have to be taken 
into account to design the tasks and argumentative practices that trigger 
collaborative and effective work. 
 
2. A LOOK AT PROOFS, ARGUMENTS AND MATHEMATICAL PRACTICE  
 
Discussion on the nature of mathematical proof has a long history that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. I refer only to some recent contributions that link the idea of 
proof, argument and the kind of processes that can be found in different contexts of 
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mathematical practice in order to support my claim that argumentative practice is 
important to promote understanding, and to improve thought and creativity, 
including in mathematics. 
Johnson (2000, p. 168) defines argument as “the distillate of the practice of 
argumentation”. For him, in addition to the reasons to support a claim (the illative 
core of the argument), “an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer 
discharges his dialectical obligations”. As he considers that mathematical proofs do 
not have this “dialectical tier”, they are not (paradigmatic) arguments. As Tindale 
(2002) points out, “this concept of argument is hampered by an internal tension 
between the product an argument is and the process it captures” (p. 299) because 
mathematical proofs appear in many types of argumentative situation and the idea 
that mathematical proofs are more than chains of deductive inferences is nowadays 
supported in very different fields or disciplines. 
From the field of argumentation, Aberdein (2009) presents an insightful 
recompilation of references in which authors appeal directly to studies on 
mathematical proof and mathematical practice. In this paper and in many others 
(see references), Aberdein considers that much of what mathematicians do, in 
particular proofs, may be understood as a “species of argument”, considering it “an 
act of communication intended to lend support to a claim” (p. 1-2). Several authors 
(for example, Alcolea Banegas, 1998; Aberdein, 2010; Dove, 2009) consider that the 
way mathematicians analyze and assess mathematical reasoning is closer to the way 
informal logicians analyze and assess ordinary arguments than what the convention 
about mathematical proof asserts, namely, that the reconstruction of a mathematical 
proof should conform to a chain of valid deductive arguments. As a consequence, 
they think that elements of the new theories of argument(ation) may be of help to 
assess mathematical proofs as given in practice. Krabbe (2008) distinguishes 
different types of mathematical activity with various objectives and examines 
examples of strategic maneuvering in mathematical proofs. 
From the field of the philosophy of mathematics, Pólya and Lakatos’s 
pioneering work to present proofs based on their own heuristic experience did not 
resonate with the mainstream of the discipline, except perhaps for the application of 
their proposals to mathematical education. The deductivist and logicistic 
approaches to science in general, and to mathematics in particular, were the 
conventional approaches during the majority of the last century. The emphasis on 
the objects or results promoted losing sight of the processes by which they were 
obtained (Ferreirós, 2010). Nowadays, there is a widespread eagerness to overcome 
the foundational view on mathematics that considers mathematical theorems a 
priori truths that are there, in the void, waiting to be discovered. Instead, there is a 
new emphasis to understand how proofs are developed and built and many 
philosophers of mathematics are now concerned with the kinds of activities 
mathematicians perform, that is, how the practice of mathematics is actually carried 
out (Mancosu, 2008). There is a turn to the practical (Gabbay & Woods, 2005) and 
the dividing line between the pair product/process, the first conceived as an object 
of analysis subject to a normative evaluation, and the second seeking to 
accommodate the descriptive adequacy of real practices, has begun to blur. 
Aberdein (2011) provides us again with a good summary of references of works that 
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try to integrate insights from many fields into a new philosophy of mathematical 
practice. 
 In traditional mathematics education, mathematics consists of readymade 
perfect products transmitted directly by the teacher in an authoritative but also 
authoritarian way. All is set up to be accepted. The process of discovery or of 
construction that led to these products is hardly considered. Communication is 
oriented mainly to the explanation of difficult steps in proofs, the resolution of 
repetitive problems as applications of the theory and the assessment of the 
solutions. Argumentation (in the ordinary sense of the term) among students or 
with the teacher is not usual. The focus is on knowing that something is the case, not 
on how it can be constructed. This fact can be explained in part by the difficulty that 
many students encounter to assimilate abstract concepts and by the need to address 
very long curricula. At elementary levels, a constructivist approach to mathematics 
is nowadays more common, but as soon as the contents of the curriculum 
accumulate, the traditional way of doing mathematics is still prevalent in many 
countries. As a consequence, many students give up on understanding mathematics 
and apply the results or methods in a mechanical and rote way. If we think of 
education as a way of pursuing a method to construct knowledge in the mind of the 
student, the classical approach to mathematics is clearly not the ideal.  
If we look at the practice of mathematics in any particular setting, we soon 
realize that, to establish the right path of valid inferences that lead to the solution of 
a problem, we first have to perform many different activities. For example, we have 
to conceptualize the new ideas that can be of help to solve the problem and to do so, 
we have, maybe, to translate it into another more familiar domain. We also have to 
find a proof strategy able to solve the problem and, to arrive at that, we have to 
identify a promising direction to find the solution and/or to dismiss other 
directions. We may have to explain to ourselves or to others the reasons to adopt or 
to reject this strategy, that is, to explain why we think this direction is appropriate 
or why it will not work. We have to confirm that the strategy works by being able to 
express the particular details that conform to it; to do so, we may have to express 
those technical or difficult details that lead to the solution to make it 
comprehensible to others and, at the same time, we may have to eliminate those 
details that at first seemed to be necessary, but that finally are not. In addition, we 
may have to go back to the first formulation of the problem to readdress its initial 
conditions by including additional preconditions to accommodate the solution 
found. We may also look for ways to adapt the problem and its solution to an actual 
problem in a specific field. We may want to refine the proof to make it clearer or 
more elegant. Finally, we may have to communicate the problem and its solution to 
different audiences.  
The ideas involved in these tasks are in many cases tentative, incomplete or 
even incorrect and have to be developed or explained in order to be included in the 
final presentation of the solution or in the proof of the theorem. Not all this material 
is included in the final product, but all of this is part of the mathematical practice 
that leads to the solution. Those intermediate steps towards the solution are 
important to understand how mathematics works.  
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If we think of practice in mathematics as a set of complex activities and tasks 
to be performed in order to solve a mathematical problem, not only logical 
reasoning but also good arguing is a very valuable tool to improve understanding 
and creativity, as I try to show in the following sections.  
 
3. MATHEMATICS AND ARGUMENTATION  
 
The influence of Johnson’s definition of argument and the reaction to it from some of 
the researchers coming from the field of mathematical argumentation can be easily 
seen in many of the papers cited in the last section. For example, Dove (2009) 
presents many mathematical examples to try to show that the method by which 
mathematicians assess mathematical reasoning resembles the practice of informal 
logic or argumentation theory. Alcolea Banegas (1998), Aberdein (2005) and many 
others (see Aberdein, 2009 for references) try to adapt Toulmin’s layout to 
mathematics. Aberdein (2010) and Dove (2009) consider how some of the 
argumentation schemes in the work of Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008) may be of 
use to evaluate mathematics. Epstein (2012) proposes an account of mathematical 
reasoning by means of two parallel structures: an inferential structure of formal 
derivations and an argumentation structure by which mathematicians attempt to 
convince each other. Aberdein (2012), following this proposal, discusses theoretical 
conceptions of mathematical practice by analyzing the nature of steps that should be 
admitted to the argumentational structure in a mathematical proof.  
In many of these papers, the main concern is to show that there is 
argumentation in mathematics. To do so, the authors often discuss examples of 
problems, proofs or different kinds of mathematical error, either to show how 
mathematicians evaluate them in practice or to show that the way in which the neat 
final results were reached was by refining previous faulty results, using to that end 
ordinary communicative forms in a language that was not totally formalized. Either 
way, the authors justify, can have a parallel in ordinary theories of argumentation.  
To give an example, Dove (2009, pp. 140-141) comments on one of the faulty 
proofs in the work of Maxwell (1959) in which the proposed task is to prove that any 
given triangle is isosceles1.  
First of all, maybe there could be someone, somewhere, who considers this a 
true problem and is trying to find a proof for it, but it is difficult to imagine such a 
situation. Moreover, the proposed proof begins with a diagram of a triangle that 
clearly is not isosceles. After that, a very detailed notation is used; there is an appeal 
to two mathematical theorems (the angle bisection theorem and the sine rule) and a 
series of careful mathematical steps are given. That is, the method used is 
mathematical. Then, the supposed author of the proof makes the error of 
considering that, from the equality of sines, the equality of angles follows.  
The error is trickier to find in the original example because of many of the 
factors already cited (use of graphics, notational details, the appeal to mathematical 
                                                 
 
1
 Examples from Maxwell can also be found in Aberdein (2010). A very similar example to this one 
from Wikipedia can be found in Krabbe (2008). 
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theorems, etc.). Dove uses this example to illustrate how people proceed when 
confronted with an evidently faulty result and to defend that “the process one uses 
to discover the mistake is analogous to the process one might use to criticize an 
unpalatable argument in non-mathematical settings” (p. 6). Nevertheless, in my 
opinion, the example lacks a real context. For example, in a classroom setting, a 
teacher would not need much time to discover the error. It is a common error made 
time and again by students of elementary trigonometry. What is not typical of a 
classroom context is the careful notation, the use of two theorems and the attentive 
and mathematical style of the proof. All of this makes natural for many to attempt to 
find a more sophisticated kind of error. I think that, in order to learn more about the 
nature of mathematical practice and how its products are evaluated, we should be 
looking at real examples of this practice, including the contextual elements of the 
situations in which they were produced.  
Other lines of defense on the argumentative nature of mathematics are the 
appeal to the axiom of choice (Dove, 2009; Alcolea Banegas, 1998, among others), 
the surveyability of long proofs (Coleman, 2009) or even the use of mathematical 
diagrams (Larvor, 2012). All of them try to underline the “challengeable” nature of 
at least some mathematical proofs and to defend the idea that some results can be 
accepted not only because of their validity, but also because they are useful for 
mathematics. This being true, it is also true that many proofs in mathematics are 
deductive. In my opinion, there is no need to appeal to special cases to defend the 
assertion that, in mathematical practice, there is a place for argumentation. We only 
have to distinguish between mathematical products and mathematical practice. As 
Kuhn (1992) states, thinking as argument “arises every time a significant decision 
must be made” (p. 157).  
 Pólya (1945, 1954) and Lakatos (1976) are cited in every work that tries to 
emphasize the plausible and heuristic nature of mathematical practice but, then, 
examples tend to show the argument in the products instead of the practice. As 
noticed by many authors, mathematical practice is not always successful and in 
many cases it creates “knowledge” that is neither precise, rigorous nor certain 
(Chazan, 1990). It is, I think, in this process that argumentation has a natural place.  
 From a review of many of the papers cited above we can extract two main 
ideas. First, Johnson’s influential definition placed a burden on many of their 
authors to justify the claim that mathematical products are argumentative. Second, 
there is a manifest tension in these works between the examples of mathematical 
products considered as arguments and the process that leads to them.  
 At first glance, Krabbe (2008) seems to avoid this problem because he takes 
note of the “various contexts in which proofs occur and of the various objectives 
they may serve” (p. 453). He also proposes a list of contexts of proof and the 
supposed functions of reasoning in them by their association to different types of 
dialogue:  
 
1. thinking up a proof to convince oneself of the truth of some theorem;  
2. thinking up a proof in dialogue with other people (inquiry dialogue; probative 
functions of reasoning); 
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3. presenting a proof to one’s fellow discussants in an inquiry dialogue 
(persuasion dialogue embedded in inquiry dialogue; persuasive and probative 
functions of reasoning); 
4. presenting a proof to other mathematicians, e.g. by publishing it in a journal 
(persuasion dialogue; persuasive and probative functions of reasoning); 
5. presenting a proof when teaching (information-seeking and persuasion 
dialogue; explanatory, persuasive, and probative functions of reasoning) 
(Krabbe, 2008, p. 457). 
 
The first two types of activity are not considered argumentative owing to the 
characteristics associated by Walton & Krabbe (1995) with the type of dialog in 
which they occur. For Krabbe, probative functions are intended to extend 
knowledge and are not argumentative. In order to have persuasive functions, the 
aim should be to convince another by overcoming her doubts (p. 457).  
 Nevertheless, it is in the situation of thinking up a proof or of looking for the 
solution to a problem that there is doubt and dialectic situations can appear (clearly 
with respect to others, but even with respect to oneself). When trying to establish 
the inferential structure that glues together the initial conditions and the solution or 
the claim, there are many situations in which a choice has to be made in conditions 
of uncertainty. There may be many methods to try that could be of use. You may 
need to persuade the other (or yourself) that a particular path of inquiry is better 
that another or that some conjecture is adequate to solve a problem. There may also 
be situations in which, although the inference seems valid, you may ask yourself or 
other people to look for possible counterexamples to the claim. There may be cases 
in which the solution to a problem is already known, but, nevertheless, you may 
want to try it with specific examples before thinking up how to prove it, and so on.  
 Another difference between the first two situations and the other three in the 
list that could, maybe, be invoked is that, when thinking up a proof, there is no need 
for language interaction. Language is an important tool for thinking in mathematics 
(Thurston, 1994). The need to formulate careful definitions and the use of specific 
notation seem fundamental to advance in the construction of a proof. Thinking up a 
proof with other people without linguistic interaction seems impossible and, if 
communication is needed, it is difficult to distinguish this case from that of a 
presentation of a proof to other people (case 4) except for the fact that, here, there is 
doubt involved and dialectical and rhetorical elements have, in my opinion, a role to 
play. 
 The two first activities in the list are just those that correspond to the 
discovery process in mathematics (Lakatos, 1976) or in rhetorical terms to the 
inventio part before the deliverance of a speech or the production of a written text. 
In those situations, the dialog types are always complex. It could be of use to 
separate the five types of activity for theoretical purposes, but at least the first two 
appear in general to be mixed up with one of the others. 
 A problem is always proposed or considered in a specific contextual situation 
(be it a classroom context, an academic situation or even a proposal to solve a 
problem through the internet) and, although the solution to it may be unique, if we 
consider the definition of argumentation given by van Eemeren et al. (1996) that 
considers argumentation as a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at 
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increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a standpoint, the activity of looking 
up for a solution stands in accordance with this definition.   
 Krabbe considers the dialectical component of a proof to lie in the number of 
inferential steps it contains. However, I think that inferential steps correspond to 
the logical part of the proof and dialectical components correspond to the 
communicative situations in which mathematical practice is undertaken. All the 
situations in the list are communicative events in which an audience is involved (in 
the first one, only oneself). When communicating mathematical work, abstract 
notation, uses of previous works and deductive inferences are always involved. In 
those cases, explanation of some inferential steps or definitions may be needed to 
enhance understanding and to accept the proof. As Mancosu (2011) states, demands 
for explanation in proofs do not always come with a new proof, but they may 
contribute to reinforce it, so I consider that they have their place in the dialectical 
tier of the argumentative exchange.  
 Besides, there could be some (easy) cases where persuasion (or conviction) 
could be reached only by understanding the inferential process in the proof. In those 
cases, when presenting the proof to others, rhetorical and communicational 
elements would surely be present, but not necessarily dialectical moves.  
 To finish with, I think that what is behind this list is the necessity of a final 
proof to assign persuasive functions to a mathematical situation. There is again the 
tension between the practice and the products of this practice. There is also the 
legacy of the deductivist approach to mathematics and, perhaps, the added difficulty 
of observing practice in different real situations. 
 Much more work is needed to observe and understand the relationship 
between actual mathematical practices and argumentation in different contexts in 
order to design protocols that can help in the development of a better 
understanding of, and to improve thought and creativity in, mathematics. Empirical 
research from the field of mathematical education could be of help to understand 
better how mathematics and argumentation are handled in the classroom. The 
analysis of Pease & Martin (2012) of the third Mini-Polymath project (Tao, 2011), 
involving online collaborative work to solve a mathematical problem, also 
represents a good step to explore another type of context. Finally, it is worth 
considering the first exploration of van Bendengem & van Kerkhove (2009) to 
situate mathematical arguments in context, by looking at their commentaries on the 
organization of a large research program to prove a difficult theorem and on the 
mode of presentation of a paper by Pólya.  
 
4. ARGUING, PROVING AND LEARNING IN MATHEMATICS  
 
Learning has traditionally been defined as the integration of new information with 
existing knowledge (Andriessen, 2009). However, a learner’s previous knowledge 
can inhibit the integration of new information because this knowledge may have 
proved efficient in different situations in the past (Balacheff, 2010). A good way to 
overcome this problem is by argumentation. 
Mathematical ideas may not be a matter of opinion or belief, but arguing is 
important as a type of communication to fix a (shared) understanding of 
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mathematical concepts, to improve inferential steps and to question the solution to 
a problem. Although some researchers in mathematical education consider that “the 
key role of proof is the promotion of mathematical understanding” (Hanna, 2000, p. 
5), a more careful look at what those authors mean by proof shows that, for them 
too, it means much more than mere syntax or a chain of valid deductive steps and 
includes ordinary argumentative elements to promote understanding. 
 Schwarz (2009) presents an outline of the complex relationships between 
argumentation and learning. To begin with, there are different approaches to the 
definition of what constitutes learning and each conception determines the role of 
the argumentation in the classroom.  
 For some psychologists, learning is a psychological change in the individual 
that can be observed indirectly between successive activities. For others, learning 
emerges through interactions. These two views may not be incompatible, but they 
have been considered as if they were so from a theoretical point of view and they 
can be representative of the way mathematical education has been undertaken 
throughout history.  
 While the traditional view maintains that the acquisition of mathematical 
skills is individually undertaken, a more accurate view considers that the interaction 
with peers and a teacher is essential. When adopting the second view, many 
researchers think that the role of argumentation is central, even in mathematics 
(Muller Mirza & Perret-Cremont, 2009). Nevertheless, the relationship between 
argumentation and learning in mathematics is complex because, in learning, there 
are multiple processes involved and different forms of undertaking them.  
 One of the processes involved in mathematical learning is the 
conceptualization of mathematical ideas. Empirical research proves that 
argumentation may represent an important tool to intervene in the progressive 
construction of basic mathematical concepts and in the development of 
consciousness and systematic links when it is guided by careful mediation of the 
teacher and a good design of the task, which has to take into account the 
appropriateness of it with respect to the class (Douek & Scali, 2000). As these 
authors have shown for elementary education, the relationship between doubt and 
communication through argumentation can serve as the basis to encourage 
questioning, expression and evolution of conceptualization in mathematics. 
 Another process in mathematical education is the acquisition of reasoning 
skills. Several researchers have stressed the psychological gap that separates 
arguing and proving in the classroom (Schwarz, 2009). In many cases, the 
presentation of a proof is not persuasive enough to convince a student of its validity 
(Duval, 1991; Healy & Hoyles, 2000). Argumentative dialogs between students 
and/or with the teacher may help to bridge this gap because proofs are then 
conceived as constructions built up through an interactive process that looks for the 
understanding and the acknowledgment of the student who has to explain all the 
steps of the inferential process. Nevertheless, careful guidance of the process may be 
needed to transform spontaneous or even authoritarian interchanges into 
argumentative situations that are of help to understand it (Atzmon, Hershkowitz & 
Schwarz, 2006).  
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 The educational system does not facilitate the development of good 
argumentative practices in higher levels of education. The pressure to cover all the 
material leaves insufficient time for arguing in mathematics classes and thus 
students merely assume the value of proof in mathematics, even if they do not fully 
understand how it works. They assume that the lack of understanding is due to a 
lack of knowledge. Discussion to promote understanding is not common in 
mathematics classes in higher education. As soon as the curriculum becomes more 
advanced, this lack of understanding presents an obstacle to many students and the 
gap between the application of the theory and the practical work they need to do to 
solve problems may widen. Repetition of techniques is a typical way to acquire 
mathematical knowledge. As a consequence, many students do not fully understand 
what they are doing and fail when a different kind of problem is proposed or 
integration of different concepts is needed.  
 Argumentative dialogs can be used to attain different goals depending on the 
context in which they arise. For example, a mathematical problem in the classroom 
can be presented as a kind of collaborative task in which two or more parties work 
together to resolve it. Another goal of an argumentative dialog can be that of 
developing competences related to critical reasoning. However, how could we relate 
that to mathematics? For instance, a way of promoting mathematical understanding 
and avoiding mistakes could be to look at the different solutions proposed to solve a 
task in order to compare, to relate and to evaluate them. A simple first-order 
equation can be solved, for instance, by algebraic or by geometric means. The 
solution may be unique, but comparison of methods may help to improve the critical 
assessment of mathematical methods.  
 To sum up, in order to achieve good cognitive development, it is important 
that the student learns to argue, but also that she argues to learn in different 
contexts with different goals (Andriessen, Baker & Suthers, 2003).  
 Nevertheless, not all the dialogical attempts to use argumentation as a 
collaborative method to solve a problem and to improve understanding are 
successful (Andriessen, 2009). As empirical research shows (Douek, 2005), 
mediation by an instructor may be needed to trigger productive argumentative 
practices. For example, it could be necessary to question statements that are not 
really helpful in understanding a problem, to integrate discussions or arguments 
provided by different students, and to generate and integrate new statements, 
among others. As a consequence, it is important that teachers have pedagogical and 
theoretical skills to foster argumentation in the classroom. Moreover, the activities 
need to be well designed and the implementation of a good design for an 
argumentative mathematical task may need to include some of the sociological 
characteristics of the group for which the task is designed. Only in this way can 
argumentation serve as a tool to promote understanding, to reinforce reasoning 
skills and as an efficient method to achieve good results in mathematics.  
The discovery part of a proof is possibly the most difficult phase of any 
mathematical work. As Kerber & Pollet (2007, p. 87) state, deduction systems may 
be suitable as proof checkers in many cases, but lack the capacity to act as proof 
assistants for the exploration and construction of new mathematical knowledge. 
Argumentation theory and direct observation of real mathematical practice may be 
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of help to design protocols to facilitate mathematical work, but as Pease & Martin 
(2012) remark, we are still a long way from a system that could contribute in a 
human-like manner to a mathematical discussion that has the goal of solving a 
problem. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper, I have presented several considerations from mathematics to try to 
show some of the differences between the product of a practice and the practice 
itself that are not reflected by careful analysis and evaluation of its products. 
 Much of what is done in mathematics is informal in the sense that it is not 
done in a pure formal system. In practice, in mathematical proofs, there are gaps 
and appeals to intuition (by the use of diagrams, for example), and proofs are not 
fully formalized. Controversies occur and are in practice dealt with without fully 
formalizing them. However, standards of rigor are specific and additional 
requirements of mathematical practice and proofs are always achieved and checked 
by the mathematical community according to those standards.  
 Proofs arise in dialogical contexts (even when thinking up a proof to 
convince oneself). Doubt is always present in the period of discovery of a proof or 
while looking for the solution to a problem. As a consequence, in the process of 
proving, argumentation, as in ordinary contexts, is always present. As Pólya (1954) 
stated, “we secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative reasoning, but we 
support our conjectures by plausible reasoning” (p. vi). 
 Presentation of mathematical products is a communicative act and, as usual 
in such acts, not all the communicational elements are made explicit. In 
mathematical proofs, gaps are intentionally left, but those gaps need not correspond 
to faulty inferential steps (Fallis, 2003). In many cases, several steps of the 
inferential process are left out to facilitate communication and to adapt to the 
context. For example, a long proof with all the small inferential steps made explicit 
may be boring for working mathematicians. An outline of the proof or of the 
problem may be sufficient and more informative than a complete proof in a 
classroom or in a scientific meeting. We can express the difference by saying that, in 
this case, we are making someone see the proof versus letting someone know the 
proof (Vega, 1999).  
 Rhetorical elements to persuade may and should be part of the process of 
communicating a mathematical result, but the dialectical component may or may 
not be present. For example, in a presentation of a mathematical result, there can be 
(or not) demands for a better explanation of it, and there can be (or not) requests 
for a better, clearer or more detailed display of the steps in the proof or some of the 
concepts involved in it. The appeal to diagrams, images, analogies or rhetorical 
figures can be not only of help but even a must in order to make the result 
understandable and, as a consequence, acceptable for the (mathematical) audience. 
As a result doubts and even a display of counterexamples or a rebuttal of the proof 
can occur, that is, an argumentative dialog may begin, but does not have to.  
 Mathematical practice is complex and, in many cases, collaborative work can 
be helpful to advance towards comprehension and solution of a problem. This is 
BEGOÑA CARRASCAL 
 12 
particularly clear in classroom settings, but it can also be seen in contexts involving 
more advanced mathematics. The Mini-Polymath projects are a good example of 
collaborative work over the internet to solve difficult conjectures and open 
problems in mathematics (Pease & Martin, 2011). When collaboration is 
undertaken, argumentation is always present and may help to accomplish many 
mathematical tasks that go beyond those of analyzing and evaluating a proof. The 
use of argumentative diagrams may also be useful to organize the process towards 
the proof. As Pease and Martin state, careful consideration should be given to 
mathematical practice in order to design protocols that help in a human-like manner 
to improve mathematical thinking. To advance in this direction, more attention 
should be paid to the different contexts in which practice is undertaken in order to 
look for special requirements that apply in those contexts. Social dimensions of 
practice should be considered if we want to construct better ways of arguing and, as 
a consequence, of thinking, including in mathematics. 
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